by Neil Colville-Reeves“Other Insurance” and “Irreconcilable Limiting Intentions”
What happens when two insurers cover the same risk and each declare themselves excess to other available insurance? Ontario’s Court of Appeal addressed that issue in the recent case of TD General Insurance v. Intact Insurance, which involved a claim for bodily injury advanced by a passenger in a boat driven by the insured.
The TD policy covered the specific boat involved in the accident and the driver was covered as he was operating the boat with the owner’s consent. The driver was also covered under his homeowner’s policy with Intact, which provided liability coverage for claims arising out of the insured’s use or operation of any type of watercraft. Each policy declared itself excess to other available insurance.
Because the TD policy specifically covered the boat in question, the application judge held that the TD policy provided primary insurance for the watercraft in question and dismissed TD’s application that the two policies share equally in the defence and indemnity of the driver. In doing so he relied on the ‘closeness to the risk approach’ in which courts consider:
- Which policy specifically described the accident causing instrumentality?
- Which premium reflect the greater contemplated exposure?
- Is coverage of the risk primary in one policy and incidental to the other?
Unfortunately the Supreme Court of Canada expressly rejected this approach to overlapping coverage in the Family Insurance Corp. v. Lombard Canada Ltd. Case. Instead, the Supreme Court preferred to focus on “whether the insurers intended to limit their obligation to contribute, by what method, and in what circumstances vis-à-vis the insured”. Because the contest, as here was between two insurers, the court held that there was no need to look to surrounding circumstance and instead relies strictly on the policy wording. If there are no limiting intentions or limiting intentions that cannot be reconciled, the burden is shared equally between the insurers. The Court of Appeal considered the identical ‘other insurance clauses’ to be limiting intentions. Because each policy was declared excess to the other, the court concluded that they were irreconcilable. As a result, the policies had to contribute equally. The reasons of the Court of Appeal in this case are nuanced and underscore the importance of a close reading of policy wording when faced with a circumstance of overlapping coverages.
by Kevin MitchellThe Tort Threshold. Not all is as it seems.
The case of O’Brien v. O’Brien, 2018 ONSC 4665, is a tort threshold motion brought by some of the defendants after a jury trial where damages was the only issue. The damages quanta were found to be closer to the defendants’ position thereupon. The motion was heard by Justice McKelvey of the Superior Court with reasons, dated July 31, 2018. Regulation 461/96 was referenced, which sets out criteria to be considered upon such a motion. In deciding the motion, it was noted the jury’s verdict was not binding upon His Honour but the findings of fact implicit thereto worthy of serious consideration. It was the plaintiff’s burden, on balance, to prove the threshold was met.
Barry O’Brien was a passenger in a pickup truck piloted by his uncle, James O’Brien, which collided head on with a transport. Among other things, he sustained an ankle fracture in the accident. In respect of other injuries sustained, he had significant pre-existing health issues. Credibility at the motion was not contested and the Judge, in fact, found the plaintiff to underestimate the impact of his injuries. The plaintiff’s orthopod was preferred due to recency of assessment and area of subspecialty. The evidence of the various health practitioners was reviewed in coming to a determination about the various alleged impairments. The left ankle was found to be permanently impaired. Ankle function was found to be ‘important’ to the plaintiff. The ‘seriousness’ criterion was found to be met despite the plaintiff making significant strides to overcome many of the effects of his impairment. Despite the Judge’s review required to consider the plaintiff’s condition ‘at the time of trial’, a likely future inability to work could be considered if a proper evidentiary foundation had been laid. The concern for the Judge on motion was that the jury awarded nothing for future income loss or vocational retraining. Despite the verdict, his Honour found the ankle impairment seriously affecting the ability to continue regular employment. In conclusion, the ankle impairment was found permanent, important and serious in relation to employment but not to his usual daily activities; as the interference with hunting was not ‘most’ of his usual activities.
Said The Prince to Portia in The Merchant of Venice, “all that glitters is not gold”. The defence motion was dismissed.
Kevin is a Partner of Samis+Company. Throughout his career, he has practiced almost exclusively in the area of accident benefit and bodily injury matters arising from motor vehicle accidents. He has also defended various non-motor vehicle bodily injury claims. Kevin carries on a robust practice involving privately arbitrated disputes between insurers in both priority and loss transfer matters.
by Neil Colville-ReevesWhat’s Reasonable?
What’s Reasonable?
That is of course a subjective question and one that you won’t find an explicit answer for in the case of Konopka v. Traders. However, you will read about what is not considered to be reasonable conduct in the context of an OAP 1 policy breach. In Konopka, the elderly insured fell ill while driving to her cottage and permitted her unlicensed husband to drive her vehicle to a nearby parking lot where they intended to stop and rest until she felt better. Shortly after taking the wheel, the unlicensed husband caused an accident. There was no dispute that the insured was aware that her husband was unlicensed and as a result on the face of it she was in breach of the ‘authorized by law to drive’ provision in section 4(1) of the policy. The insurer denied coverage as a result.
The court noted that a breach of this nature was subject to a strict liability standard which required that the insured to establish that she took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event. The reasonableness standard requires a consideration of the nature of the breach, what caused it and all of the surrounding circumstances that explain the act or omission. The court ultimately determined that it was not reasonable for the insured to allow her husband to drive. It is worth noting that the court relied in large part on the discovery transcript of the husband which betrayed a level of confusion and an inability to focus. The court ultimately concluded that the husband was someone ‘who simply cannot get his bearings’ and as a result it was not reasonable to allow him to drive, regardless of the circumstances.
This case is fact driven but provides a good counterpoint to the decision of Ontario’s Court of Appeal in Kozel v. Personal. In that case, the insured was also in breach of section 4(1) for driving while she was not authorized by law to drive. However, in that case the license suspension was the result of a failure to respond to a license renewal notice which was considered to be a ‘relatively minor breach’. In contrast, allowing an elderly individual who had an ‘inability to get his bearings’ and who had not driven in more than 20 years was something quite different and ultimately, not reasonable. https://bit.ly/2KoWLxQ
by Kevin MitchellDiscovery Motions – Hoist by Her Own Petard: Hamlet 2.0
In this Shakespeareanesque drama respecting three related motor vehicle tort actions, Aviva, as third party, successfully motioned under Rule 31.10, at what appears to be the outset of the trials, to discover three “non-parties”. All three plaintiffs were in the same vehicle and represented by the same lawyer but each (more likely their lawyer) elected to sue the defendant, Backs, in three different actions. Despite an earlier order to be tried together or one after the other, the actions remained separate proceedings.
The non-parties to be discovered were actually the three plaintiffs; each a technical stranger to the others’ cases. Aviva wanted testimony from the two ‘strangers’ in each case as to the effects of the accident upon each plaintiff going both to credibility and damages. The questions were refused in discoveries about two years prior as not being relevant to the action in which they were being asked.
Mr. Justice de Sa in his April 4, 2018 reasons held that use of the Rule was an exception but not meant as a means to limit access to a witness with relevant evidence. Technically, considering the order for trial together there was a right to ask the impugned questions which were clearly relevant and not collateral. The decision to sue in three actions and take a narrow view of relevance was felt to frustrate the discovery process. The plaintiffs’ positions added costs and delay to the proceedings and contravened various principles, not the least of which was their determination on the merits. Some might say that concept has suffered for some time now.
The motion was granted for discovery of each of the non-parties. Aviva was awarded $7,000.00 in costs. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern should have been so lucky. Creative use of the Rules, yes. Ultimately in the best interest of the plaintiffs, no. See Kissoon v. Aviva 2018 ONSC 2167.
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2018/2018onsc2167/2018onsc2167.html
by Daniel StrigbergerONCA Affirms Vicarious Liability for Possession
[et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.9″]The Court of Appeal for Ontario has released a decision dealing with whether an owner of an ATV can be held vicariously liable for a driver’s negligence, even though no consent was given to operate the vehicle. The decision is of interest because a five-member panel of the Court heard the case and overruled a previous decision of the Court.
In Fernandes v Araujo, Fernandes was seriously injured while a passenger on an ATV. The ATV was owned by Carlos Almeida and insured by Allstate. Eliana Araujo was the driver of the ATV; she had a G1 licence at the time of the accident.
Carlos was fixing a fence on his farm with some of his friends, including Eliana. Carlos told Eliana that she could drive the ATV on the farm, while Carlos’ cousin, Jean Paul, told Eliana not to leave the farm on the ATV. Carlos did not expressly forbid Eliana and Fernandes to leave the farm, although later he said if Eliana and Fernandes had asked him to leave the property he would have said no.
Eliana and Fernandes left the property to drive over to a nearby farm on a public road without permission. While returning back from the nearby farm, the ATV rolled over and Fernandes was seriously injured.
Allstate brought two summary judgment motions. The first motion dealt with whether Allstate was liable to provide insurance coverage when the owner of the ATV did not give his consent for Eliana and Fenandes to drive it.
The second summary judgment motion asked the court to dismiss Eliana’s third party claim because she was operating the ATV without the owner’s consent and was operating the ATV contrary to Statutory Condition (4.1) of O.Reg 777/93, which states that an insured shall not operate, drive or permit another person to operate or drive a vehicle unless they are authorized by law to do so.
Allstate’s motion in the main action was dismissed and was granted in the third party action.
In the main action, the judge relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Finlayson v. GMAC Leasco Ltd. In Finlayson, the Court of Appeal held that vicarious liability under section 192(1) of the Highway Traffic Act is based on possession, not operation, of a vehicle, following an old line of authority (Thomson v. Bouchier). Section 192 provides:
192 (2) The owner of a motor vehicle or street car is liable for loss or damage sustained by any person by reason of negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle or street car on a highway, unless the motor vehicle or street car was without the owner’s consent in the possession of some person other than the owner or the owner’s chauffeur. [emphasis added]
In Finlayson, it was stated that if an owner gives possession of a vehicle to another, and the owner expressly prohibits that person from operating the vehicle, the owner is nonetheless vicariously liable for the negligent operation of that vehicle.
The motions judge had to reconcile this decision with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Newman v. Terdik. In Newman, Terdik was a tobacco owner who gave his worker permission to use the defendant’s automobile to travel down a laneway between two tobacco farms, but was expressly forbidden from driving on the highway. The worker drove on the highway where he hit the plaintiff, Newman, who sustained injuries. The Court of Appeal held that the worker did not have possession of the vehicle with consent; therefore, Terdik was not vicariously liable. The Court of Appeal found that possession is a fluid concept; it can change from rightful to wrongful possession or to possession with or without consent.
The judge found that Newman was distinguishable because Carlos did not expressly impose any restrictions on Eliana’s operation of the vehicle; he gave her possession of that vehicle. The fact that Carlos’ cousin expressly forbid Araujo from leaving the property could not be attributed to Carlos. However, the judge went further, stating that Newman may be wrongly decided, as it did not follow Thompson v. Bourchier.
Accordingly, the judge dismissed Allstate’s motion for summary judgment and found that there was consent, as Carlos gave Eliana possession of the ATV. Allstate’s motion dealing with the third party action was allowed.
Allstate appealed the summary judgment decision, raising two issues:
- Did the motion judge err by concluding that in the absence of an express prohibition against taking the ATV off the farm property, the owner must be taken to have consented to possession at the time of the accident?
- Did the motion judge err by failing to follow the decision of this court in Newman?
With respect to the first issue, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Allstate’s argument that the test for consent essentially turns on the subjective belief of the party in possession of the vehicle. The court found that this approach would allow anyone with actual possession of the vehicle to fix the owner with liability even where the owner had not consented to that person having possession of the vehicle:
The focus of the language and purpose of the provision are on the actions of the owner who is charged with the responsibility of exercising appropriate caution when giving another person possession of the vehicle.
With respect to the Newman decision, the Court noted that Newman stood for the proposition that “possession can change from rightful possession to wrongful possession, or from possession with consent to possession without consent” where the person in possession violates a condition imposed by the owner. However the Court found that this principle was inconsistent with the reasoning of the line of authority outlined in Finlayson, Thompson, and long list of other decisions.
Accordingly, the Court held that Newman was wrongly decided. Accordingly, the Court overruled the case and declared that it no longer represents the law of Ontario.
The appeal was dismissed.
The decision in Fernandes confirms that vicarious liability is based on possession, not operation. Even if the owner expressly prohibits the driver from operating the vehicle, the owner will be found vicariously liable if they gave the driver possession of the vehicle and such possession was exercised at the time of the accident.
The decision makes sense in light of the plain wording of section 192 of the Highway Traffic Act. In Thompson, the Court held that the purpose of this provision is “to protect the public by imposing, on the owner of a motor vehicle, responsibility for the careful management of the vehicle.” Part of careful management would include taking steps to ensure that the person with whom an owner gives possession of the vehicle would not use that possession in a way that would cause danger to the public.
See Fernandes v. Araujo , 2015 ONCA 571.
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by Greg HeckelCan plaintiff corroborate own evidence for threshold?
[et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.9″]Under Ontario’s threshold provision, persons injured in a car accident can sue for damages for non-pecuniary loss only if they have sustained “a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function, or a permanent serious disfigurement.”
Beginning in October 2003, s. 4.3(5) of Ontario Regulation 461/96 (Court Proceedings for Automobile Accidents that Occur on or After November 1, 1996) injured persons have also had to meet evidentiary requirements prescribed by regulation. They must lead evidence of their impairment from a qualified physician and, in addition to that evidence, they must “adduce evidence that corroborates the change in the function that is alleged to be a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.”
This appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal raises a single question: can the injured person – the plaintiff – provide the corroborating evidence? The answer – “yes”.
The words of s. 4.3(5) do not expressly preclude the plaintiff or the injured person from being the corroborating witness. Section 4.3 requires the evidence of at least one physician and some other evidence of change in function. The physician’s evidence alone is not enough and the other evidence alone is not enough. That other evidence may come from the plaintiff, a family member, an employer or co-worker, another lay person, or even from surveillance or medical records. Section 4.3(5) does not exclude anyone or anything. Indeed, undoubtedly there are cases where a plaintiff cannot provide corroborating evidence – for example, if the plaintiff is a minor or was severely brain damaged in the accident – otherwise the plaintiff may corroborate the evidence from the doctor about the change in the function that is alleged to be a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.
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